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RECONSTITUTING "ORIGINAL INTENT": A 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA 
FOR THE NEXT CENTURYt 
David M. Skover* 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION. By Leonard 
Levy, Kenneth Karst and Dennis Mahoney. New York: MacMillan 
Publishing Company. 1986. Four volumes. Pp. xciv, 2196. $320. 
[T]o understand what a constitution is, one must look ... to two uses of 
the word "constitution" .... The first of these uses is "constitution" in 
the sense of composition or fundamental make-up .... The second use of 
"constitution" [is] ... the action or activity of constituting - that is, of 
founding, framing, shaping something anew .... And yet, constituting is 
not just doing whatever one pleases. . . . To constitute, one must . . . 
establish something that lasts, which, in human affairs, inevitably means 
something that will enlist and be carried forward by others. . . . So, 
although constituting is always a free action, how we are able to consti-
tute ourselves is profoundly tied to how we are already constituted by 
our own distinctive history. 
- Hanna Fenichel Pitkin 1 
Of the scholarly offerings that have accompanied the bicentennial 
celebration of the American Constitution, The Encyclopedia of the 
American Constitution is one of the most noteworthy. It is an original 
and innovative project, being the first encyclopedia of the Constitution 
ever compiled. Seeking to present "an epitome of all that is known 
and understood on the subject of the Constitution by the nation's spe-
cialist scholars" (vol. 1, p. x), it is an ambitious work. It is catholic in 
the diversity of viewpoints represented by its contributors, and in the 
range of its targeted audience. And, given eight years in planning and 
production, it must have been a labor of love for its creators. 
For appreciative readers, The Encyclopedia of the American Consti-
tution (hereinafter Encyclopedia) is likely to represent a great deal 
more. Considered in its entirety, the work describes, in a fairly bal-
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anced and accurate manner, the contemporary understanding of the 
American constitutional heritage. This heritage is portrayed as the 
product of the historical events, socioeconomic conditions, and polit-
ical and philosophical beliefs which have been seminal to the evolution 
of a national people. The Encyclopedia reveals the Constitution to be 
both a symbol that mirrors and an ideology that molds the fundamen-
tal nature, the ethos, of America. It understands the Constitution in 
both of the senses of the word explained by Professor Pitkin: as a 
tradition that constitutes us, and as a practice that reconstitutes us; as 
something that we are, and as something that we do.2 
So understood, the Constitution - or, more precisely, our vision 
of the constitutional heritage of the American people - is an apt sub-
ject for encyclopedic treatment. Indeed, the Encyclopedia exhibits the 
important functions that an encyclopedic work may serve in the legal 
culture of the twenty-first century. This review essay explores this 
thought. Part I describes the Encyclopedia's organizational structure, 
the interdisciplinary nature of its commentaries, and the divergent 
characters of its contributors. Part II considers the potential for its 
use and explores its role as the record of "original intent" for this 
century's constitutional "founders." 
I. THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ENCYCLOPEDIA 
In his celebrated 1932 essay, "The Role of an Encyclopaedia in a 
Progressive Civilization,"3 H.G. Wells argued that the intellectual and 
practical needs of the twentieth century required a new encyclopedic 
effort, with a distinctive structure and purpose. Its articles would syn-
thesize the composite of knowledge in each field of study; its entries 
would be written, edited, and critically organized by outstanding au-
thorities in that field. 4 Drawing upon "the genius of Diderot . . . 
which first revealed the power and importance latent in these great 
gatherings of fact and theory," the new encyclopedia would provide 
"the substantial basis of a modernized ideology."5 At the same time 
that civilization's debt to tradition and established custom would be 
recognized, the encyclopedia would organize the new and growing 
knowledge of the age into an effective instrument of political and so-
cial reform. Wells' agenda for the modem encyclopedia largely char-
2. Professor Pitkin summarizes the first sense in which the term "constitution" is used - as 
the "characteristic frame or nature" - by submitting that it "is less something we ha1•e than 
something we are." In contrast, the second sense of the term "is neither something we have nor 
something we are so much as something we do - or at any rate can do." Id. at 167-68. 
3. Wells, The Role of an Encyclopaedia in a Progressive Civilization, in THE WORK, WEALTH 
AND HAPPINESS OF MANKIND 763 (1932). Wells' exhortations on the modern encyclopedia 
were reiterated in a series of speeches and essays written in 1936 and 1937, and subsequently 
collected in H.G. WELLS, WORLD BRAIN (1938). 
4. Wells, supra note 3, at 763-65. 
5. Id. at 765. 
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acterizes the standard criteria for evaluating encyclopedic efforts that 
have become virtually universally accepted since the middle of the 
twentieth century. 
Clearly, the Encyclopedia fares well against measures of excellence 
for structure and organization. 6 The Encyclopedia comprises four 
volumes. The main body of volumes 1 through 4 contains approxi-
mately 2,100 entries arranged alphabetically according to subject. The 
entries vary in length, from brief definitions of terms to expansive 
treatments of important topics; the longer entries are pegged at ap-
proximately 6,000 words. All of the entries are liberally cross-refer-
enced, identified by the use of small capital letters that are readily 
distinguished from the regular print. Most entries, and all of the 
longer ones, append a bibliography of authorities to suggest avenues 
for further research. 
Volumes 1 and 4 include the utilities necessary for a research tool. 
The beginning of volume 1 presents alphabetized lists of the entries 
and the contributors. All indices and appendices are found at the end 
of volume 4. The appendices in volume 4 offer valuable amenities for 
the serious student of the Constitution. A more complete description 
of the structure and organization of the Encyclopedia can be found in 
the appendix at the end of this review. 
Not only in its organization, but in its contents and contributors, 
the Encyclopedia proves exemplary. The articles can be classified into 
five general subject categories: constitutional law doctrines; celebrated 
figures in constitutional history; judicial decisions, primarily of the 
United States Supreme Court; public acts, including statutes, treaties, 
and executive orders; and commentaries on historical eras in constitu-
tional law. The preface to the Encyclopedia establishes that about 55 
percent of the work's total volume is committed to doctrinal concepts, 
15 percent to people, 15 percent to case law, 5 percent to public acts, 
and 10 percent to historical surveys (vol. 1, p. vii). 
The editors submit that the topics were chosen, and the informa-
tion within the entries composed, so as "to bridge the disciplines of 
history, law, and political science" (vol. 1, p. vii). A mere browsing of 
the contents of any of the volumes would corroborate the degree to 
which the interdisciplinary dynamic of a subject is explored. For ex-
ample, Professors Scheiber's and Elazar's entries on federalism iden-
6. A description of the "general principles of form" by which twentieth century encyclope-
dias are judged throughout the world is given in R. COLLISON, ENCYCLOPAEDIAS: THEIR HIS-
TORY THROUGHOUT THE AGES 199 (2nd ed. 1966), a valuable work that provides a 
comprehensive and coherent account of the evolution of encyclopedias in world history. Among 
the most pertinent standards for judging excellence, articles are to be written and edited by sub-
ject specialists; liberal cross-references among articles must be provided; supplementary bibliog-
raphies are to be appended to longer subject articles; and, subject and person indexes are to be 
included. Id. See generally Encyclopaedia and Dictionaries, 18 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 
365, 366-73 (1987). 
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tify the historical stages of federalism by way of the Supreme Court's 
case law and the predominant political theories of dual sovereignty 
and cooperative federalism.7 Similarly, the historian Herman Belz 
traces the ideological concepts of statehood, nationhood, and federal 
supremacy through an analysis of the theories of union that were pre-
dominant in the nation's politics from 1789 to 1868. 8 Consider Profes-
sor Yale Kamisar's tract on the evolution of the Miranda doctrine,9 
which canvasses the history of the law of confessions with an eye to 
the doctrine's sociopolitical functions. 
This intertwining of the strands of case doctrine, social history, 
political theory, and legal philosophy, is characteristic of the entries 
both as independent articles and as related parts of the larger work, 
and is ensured in part by the editors' selection of contributors. 
Although the editors wrote many of the articles themselves (over 875 
entries or approximately 42 percent of the total work), 259 authors 
produced the remaining pieces. Among them, there are 41 historians, 
53 political scientists, 145 law professors, 18 legal practitioners, 10 fed-
eral judges, 1 .state judge, and 2 Congressmen (one current and one 
former). The balance includes policy analysts, economists, journalists, 
and publicists. Uniformly, the contributors are intellectual leaders in 
their respective fields of study; more often than not, they have pio-
neered definitive scholarly works in the particular subject matters ad-
dressed in their Encyclopedia articles. 
As a group, the contributors present numerous and diverse per-
spectives on the Constitution. The different visions of the constitu-
tional enterprise which the contributors individually hold are apparent 
in the substance and the tone of their entries.10 Thus, we see the 
originalist perspective of former Judge Robert Bork in his article on 
constitutional review, 11 in contrast to the broader interpretivist 
7. See Scheiber, Cooperative Federalism, vol. 2, p. 503; Scheiber, Dual Sovereignty, vol. 2, p. 
588; Scheiber, Federalism (History), vol. 2, p. 697; and Elazar, Federalism (Theory), vol. 2, p. 
704. The dynamic between the historical stages of federalism and the Supreme Court's promo· 
tion of federalism theories, as presented by Scheiber and Elazar, is consistent with the federalism 
analyses presented in Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. Rl!V. 
125, and the dialectic in federalism doctrine and theory traced in Skover, "Phoenix Rising" and 
Federalism Analysis, 13 HAsrJNGS CONST. L.Q. 271 (1986). Cf. Van Alstyne, The Second Death 
of Federalism," 83 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1709 (1985); and Gelfand & Abrams, Putting Erie on the 
Right Track (forthcoming), both articles holding to a more linear concept of "result-oriented" 
federalism doctrine. 
8. Belz, Theories of the Union, vol. 4, p. 1885. 
9. The Anglo-American roots of the law of admissibility of extrajudicial confessions that 
culminated in the doctrine of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and the blows inflicted 
on the doctrine in the Burger Court era, are outlined in Kamisar, Police Interrogation and Con· 
fessions, vol. 3, p. 1400. 
10. The editors confirm that they "encouraged the authors to write commentaries, in essay 
form, not merely describing and analyzing their subjects but expressing their own views .••• In 
inviting authors to contribute to the Encyclopedia, we have sought to include a range of views." 
Vol. l, p. ix. 
11. Bork, Judicial Review and Democracy, vol. 3, p. 1061. 
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method for constitutional exegesis suggested by Professor Gerald 
Gunther in his commentary on judicial review,12 or the "structuralist" 
posture in Professor Charles Black's discussion of "relational" consti-
tutional rights to be protected against infringement by private citizens 
in his essay on state action. 13 For yet another example, consider Jus-
tice Hans Linde's promotion of the independent development of state 
constitutional law:14 he argues that interpretation of state constitu-
tional guarantees "logically" precedes judicial resort to the federal Bill 
of Rights under the theory of violative state action that the fourteenth 
amendment contemplates, 15 a position which he has articulated force-
fully in the past.16 
It may be of interest to note the "whos" and the "whats" that are 
not represented, or arguably underrepresented, among the contribu-
tors. A number of notable scholars in constitutional law, history, and 
political theory are missing, although their absence understandably 
may not be due to any oversight by the editors.17 Among these schol-
ars are several who figure prominently in significant contemporary 
movements in constitutional thought, such as Critical Legal Studies, 
Feminist Jurisprudence, Law and Economics, and Libertarianism. 
Despite the presence of one Supreme Court Justice, William Brennan, 
on the Advisory Board for the Encyclopedia, no current or retired jus-
tices are contributors. Moreover, while eleven members of the judici-
ary have written articles, there is no equivalence in the representation 
of the federal and state lawmaking branches.18 
Generally, the problem of obsolescence challenges the future func-
tionality of any encyclopedia. 19 Even if revisions are not projected at 
12. Gunther, Judicial Review, vol. 3, p. 1054. 
13. Black, State Action, vol. 4, p. 1729. 
14. Linde, State Constitutional Law, vol. 4, p. 1738. 
15. Id. at 1741. 
16. See, e.g., Linde, E Pluribus - Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 
165 (1984). 
17. A partial list would include Bruce Ackerman, Anthony Amsterdam, C. Edwin Baker, 
Derrick Bell, Lillian BeVier, Philip Bobbitt, Erwin Chemerinsky, Ronald Dworkin, John Hart 
Ely, Richard Epstein, Ray Forrester, Alan David Freeman, Lawrence Friedman, Marc Galanter, 
Lino Graglia, Neil Komesar, Max Lerner, William Lockhart, Catharine MacKinnon, Robert 
Nagel, David O'Brien, Richard Davies Parker, Judge Richard Posner, H. Jefferson Powell, Mar-
tin Redish, Charles Reich, David Richards, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Ronald Rotunda, Albert 
Sacks, Lawrence Sager, Terrance Sandalow, Bernard Schwartz, Geoffrey Stone, Cass Sunstein, 
Herbert Wechsler, Gordon S. Wood, and Charles Wright. 
18. Among current federal legislators whose significant contributions to the constitutional 
enterprise in Congress may have been recognized by participation in the Encyclopedia, several 
would be obvious selections: Senators Joseph Biden, Orrin Hatch, Edward Kennedy, and Strom 
Thurmond, and Congressman Henry Hyde. 
19. As the editors of the Encyclopedia themselves admit, "[i]n a project like this one, some 
risk of obsolescence is necessarily present." Vol. 1, p. ix. This risk is highest in the entries that 
focus most heavily on doctrinal concepts. Articles dedicated to Supreme Court cases or referenc-
ing Supreme Court doctrine are current as of the Court's October 1984 Term, ending in July of 
1985. The editors ~ought to minimize the problem of obsolescence by "ask[ing] the authors of 
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this time, however, the integrity and significance of the current Ency-
clopedia are not seriously compromised. Indeed, the practice of up-
dating encyclopedias on an annual or biannual basis, common among 
the leading multi-volume general reference works published in 
America since the tum of the century, is not followed uniformly for 
"special interest" encyclopedias. The International Encyclopedia of 
the Social Sciences, also published by Macmillan and Free Press, 
serves as a classic example of a specialized encyclopedia that was only 
reissued in a completely new edition thirty years after it first ap-
peared. 20 Once the reputation and the value of the Encyclopedia are 
firmly established, at least after a generation of use, it is possible that 
Macmillan and Free Press will issue "an encyclopedia that is entirely 
new, entirely expressive of the times."21 
II. AN ENCYCLOPEDIA FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: 
RECONSTITUTING ORIGINAL INTENT 
In the preface to the Encyclopedia, the editors declare one of the 
purposes of their project: "This work seeks to fill the need for a single 
comprehensive reference work treating the subject [of the American 
Constitution] in a multidisciplinary way" (vol. 1, p. vii). Certainly, 
among the current surveys of American constitutional law, the Ency-
articles on doctrinal subjects to concentrate on questions that are fundamental and of enduring 
significance." Id. The extent to which obsolescence truly threatens the value of the Encyclopedia 
would seem to depend on the functions that it may serve for the next generation of constitutional 
students and scholars, discussed in Part II, infra. 
20. The ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (E. Seligman & A. Johnson eds. 1930-
35) was superseded by the INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (D. Sills 
ed. 1968) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA]. The associate editor of the original 
work, Professor Alvin Johnson, had tried to interest the foundations that had supported the first 
encyclopedia in financing a revision as early as 1950. In the Foreword to the 1968 publication, 
Johnson expressed sentiments that are relevant to the issue of obsolescence for any specialized 
encyclopedia: 
We who ardently wanted an encyclopedia agreed that the social sciences were undergoing 
rapid change, but they had always been undergoing change and would continue to do so. 
An encyclopedia could summarize the achievements of the outgoing generation. In twenty 
or thirty years we would need an entirely new encyclopedia, and another in twenty or thirty 
years after that. 
I had never believed in the practice of revising encyclopedias; I have always held that an 
encyclopedia, particularly one of the social sciences, should remain a historical document of 
its time and that each generation should have an encyclopedia - new from the ground up. 
Johnson, Foreword, 1 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, at xii-xiii. 
21. These were the dedicatory words of Professor Johnson that introduced the 1968 revision 
of the social sciences encyclopedia. Johnson, Foreword, 1 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, at 
xiii. The advantages of a completely new edition of an encyclopedia on the American Constitu-
tion over the periodic issuing of supplementary material should be obvious, given the nature of 
the subject matter. As a work that describes the evolving political, historical, and ideological 
heritage of a national people, to be current, the Encyclopedia must reflect differences in language 
and idea constructs, as well as describe changes in substantive legal doctrine or leading political 
and social figures. For one account of the potential for a modified liberal legal consciousness in 
future constitutional interpretation, see Collins & Skover, The Future of Liberal Legal Scholar-
ship: A Commentary, 87 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming). 
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clopedia can be regarded as sui generis. It is distinct from, the major 
treatises on constitutional doctrine and history precisely because of its 
encyclopedic character. The Encyclopedia is not an ll,iterrelated series 
of essays advancing the single theoretical perspective of a treatise 
writer.22 Neither is it a collection of independent or previously pub-
lished essays by diverse authors; its entries interlock conceptually to 
the extent that the Encyclopedia forms an integrated whole.23 
Given these characteristics, tlie Encyclopedia serves at least two 
important functions as a research tool. First, for the novice in consti-
tutional law study or in a particular area of interest in constitutional 
law, the work furnishes a useful starting point.24 Written in a style 
and at a level of abstraction that should be accessible to the general 
reader, the entries suggest avenues for further investigation of the sub-
ject matter in their bibliographies of scholarly authorities. As the en-
tries are the product of collaboration among contributors and editors 
who are subject specialists, the novice may be reasonably confident of 
the accuracy and reliability of factual information. Moreover, the 
wide spectrum of constitutional thought represented by the contribu-
tors should assure the novice of exposure to diverse perspectives. 
However one assesses the relative balance of viewpoints, the Encyclo-
pedia clearly offers a more sweeping panorama of evaluative positions 
than can be gleaned from constitutional law treatises. 
Second, the Encyclopedia may be instrumental in the teaching of 
constitutional law, legal history, political science, and philosophy, 
whether in law schools, or in graduate, undergraduate, or secondary 
schools.25 Instructors will find it a source of background readings of 
manageable length and complexity which may be suggested or as-
signed to students. Unfortunately, for heavily attended classes, stu-
dent access to the Encyclopedia may be restricted; considering the 
scope of the entire work and its retail price, only one or two copies are 
likely to be reserved in most public, university, and law school librar-
ies. Perhaps interrelated entries on major doctrinal and theoretical 
subject matters could be collected in separate books, and offered in 
22. Among constitutional law treatises, compare, for example, L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1988); C. ANTIEAU, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES (1960). Among texts of a related category, which may be classified as 
"hombooks," compare, for example, J. NOWAK & R. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d 
ed. 1986); B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A TEXTBOOK (1972); M. FORKOSCH, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1969); H. ROTfSCHAEFER, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW (1939). 
23. Compare, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL & LEGAL HISTORY SERIES (K. Hall ed. 
1987) (19 volumes). 
24. The editors recognize that "[t]or some readers an encyclopedia article will be a stopping 
point, but the articles in this Encyclopedia are intended to be doorways leading to ideas and to 
additional reading, and perhaps to the reader's development of independent judgment about the 
Constitution." Vol. 1, p. x. 
25. Apparently, the editors pointedly directed the contributors "to remember that the Ency-
clopedia will be used by readers whose interests and training vary widely." Vol. 1, p. x. 
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paperback form as supplementary course materials. It is not difficult 
to imagine, for example, that a small volume containing only the es-
says canvassing constitutional history26 would be of great interest to 
college and graduate students in history and political science. Or a 
slightly longer paperback containing the entries on cases, doctrinal 
concepts, theory, and major scholars in free speech and press law 
could be an extremely useful reference tool in a law or political science 
course on the first amendment. 
Beyond these instrumental functions, the Encyclopedia may prove 
to be an important normative enterprise. It describes the individuals 
and actions that have shaped our federal governmental system over 
time and the ideas which have infused our national value structures -
always with sensitivity to the interconnections among these various 
forces. In weaving the complex fabric that we currently recognize as 
"The Constitution," the Encyclopedia reveals the ideology that consti-
tutes us as Americans. The Encyclopedia achieves a great deal more, 
however, when it depicts the national community that we openly ac-
knowledge as our identity. Then it reinforces the beliefs and practices 
which, in their future application or modification, will reconstitute us 
as Americans. Consequently, the Encyclopedia manifests the Consti-
tution in both senses of the term explained by Professor Pitkin. 
These purposes for the Encyclopedia are confirmed by the editors' 
introductory comments on the nature of the Constitution: 
The Constitution is a legal document, but it is also an institution: a 
charter for government, a framework for building a nation, an aspect of 
the American civic culture .... In the final analysis today's Constitution 
is the product of the whole political system and the whole history of the 
many peoples who have become a nation. [vol. 1, p. vii] 
By this analysis, the Constitution is a symbol of American civic cul-
ture. It mirrors the institutions and the norms that define that culture; 
but it also molds the practices and the beliefs that sustain and reshape 
that culture.27 An understanding of the Constitution, then, requires 
26. Among the entries directed to constitutional history that might be gathered in a single 
work, certainly the series of articles entitled Constitutional History, covering the period from the 
pre-Revolutionary era to 1985, would be featured. For a list of these articles, see vol. 1, p. xxv. 
27. The editors' understanding of the Constitution as "mirror and mold" itself reflects the 
earlier constitutional law scholarship by Professors Kenneth Karst and Leonard Levy. Karst 
discerns in the institution of law, and in the practice of the law, an expression of the "shared 
values" which define and support a community. The institution of law contributes to a sense of 
community "by establishing norms which identify a group as people who owe to each other not 
merely some specific obligation, but a loyalty whose boundaries are only vaguely defined." 
Karst, Individuality, Community, and Law, in LAW AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE 68, 76 (M. 
Schwartz ed. 1976). The practice of the law reinforces the community of shared values when 
litigants, lawyers, and jurists appeal to the norms in legal disputes. See, e.g., Karst, Paths to 
Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C.L. REV. 303, 373-74 (1986). This is 
especially the case for constitutional law, which identifies and reinforces the nation's ideology, 
the "American civic culture": 
In our society, one of the most prominent bridges between ideology and behavior is the 
law, particularly constitutional law. It is fair to say that the Constitution today is our pre-
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an all-encompassing knowledge of the influences that mirror and 
mold. It is just such a "holistic" study of the American civic culture 
- its history, politics, economics, and social thought, as well as its 
legal doctrine and theory - that the Encyclopedia sponsors. 28 
As such, this twentieth-century Encyclopedia may play a vital role 
in the twenty-first century. Because it chronicles meanings that the 
Constitution holds for contemporary generations of Americans, the 
Encyclopedia is a window into the late twentieth century's conceptions 
of the nation's constitutional heritage. For the twenty-first century 
scholar and student, it may expose the framework of issues and ideas 
that have been thematically crucial to constitutional law developments 
eminent symbol of nationhood and that the doctrine of judicial review is a major practical 
support for both the attitudinal and the behavioral elements of the American civic culture. 
Id. at 373 (footnote omitted); see also Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term - Foreword: Equal 
Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REv. l, 9-10, 27 (1977); Karst, The 
Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 626, 666 (1980). 
Leonard Levy's concept of the Constitution appears quite sympathetic with Karst's. Levy 
posits that "[t]he Constitution is basically a political document," Levy, Introduction - The 
Making of the Constitution, 1776-1789, in EssAYS ON THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 
xxxvi (L. Levy ed. 2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter EssAYS], with a longevity and vitality that derive 
"from the fact that it incorporates and symbolizes the political values of a free people." Levy, 
Introduction, in AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: HISTORICAL EssAYS 4 (L. Levy ed. 1966) 
[hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]. The Bill of Rights, in Levy's estimation, embodies 
a new system of public morality based on the premise that government is but an instrument 
of man, its sovereignty held in subordination to his rights. As amended, the Constitution 
became a perm~ent reminder of its framers' view that the citizen is the master of his gov-
ernment, not its subject. 
Levy, Bill of Rights, in EssAYS, at 306. Also, similarly to Karst, Levy regards constitutional law 
as the product of judicial evolution: "In large measure, we have an unwritten constitution whose 
history is the history of judicial review." Levy, Introduction, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at 3. 
See generally Collins, The Historian as Judge (Book Review), 15 REVIEWS AM. Hisr. 191 (1987) 
(reviewing L. LEVY, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES (1985)). 
28. Given their understanding of the Constitution, it should be expected that Professors Levy 
and Karst favor a constitutional study which emphasizes the historical relationships of sociopo-
litical practices to the Constitution's protection of certain substantive values. Karst offers an 
instructive example in his examination of the evolving "freedom of intimate association." Grow-
ing judicial recognition of the values that inhere in intimate associations, he argues, is closely 
related to two egalitarian trends in recent American history: the crusade for racial equality and 
the feminist movement have accelerated an awareness of cultural diversity and an acceptance of 
variations in social roles, which have contributed in turn to the values at stake in intimate as-
sociations - self-definition, commitment and self-realization. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate 
Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 626, 659-63 (1980). Accordingly, in his Encyclopedia entry on the 
subject, Karst carefully explains the substantive values implicit in intimate associations, and the 
historical gestation of society's tolerance for diverse associations that implicate these values. 
Karst, Freedom of Intimate Association, vol. 2, p. 782. 
This emphasis on acute insight into socioeconomic developments that reveal and nurture 
values over time is evident, as well, in Levy's definitive scholarship on the freedom of the press, 
see L. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985), and on criminal procedural rights, see L. 
LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 
(1968); L. LEVY, AGAINST THE LAW: THE NIXON COURT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1974). As 
with Karst, this understanding of constitutional law study is conspicuous throughout Levy's 
articles in the Encyclopedia. His pieces, Marbury v. Madison, vol. 3, p. 1199, and Exclusionary 
Rule, vol. 2, p. 662, are fine examples of Levy's portrayal of the constitutional culture: The 
meaning of a substantive value, or the significance of a constitutional moment, is demonstrated 
by way of its relevant sociopolitical context, its historical treatment, and its ideological trappings. 
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in our day. By registering differences of opinion among its contribu-
tors as to the evolution of doctrine and theory, it may establish the 
degree of consensus or controversy that attended these changes. 
Isn't it interesting to view the Encyclopedia metaphorically as a 
record of the continuing constitutional convention in the twentieth 
century, and Professors Levy, Karst, and Mahoney as the Madisons of 
our day? For, similar to the celebrated scribe of the proceedings of the 
1787 Convention who noted the intentions of a number of the original 
framers, the editors of the Encyclopedia have collected the understand-
ings of primary figures - jurists and constitutional scholars - among 
our contemporary "reconstituters." Moreover, the many constitu-
tional law authorities who did not participate in the record-building 
project as contributors of articles stand in a parallel position to the 
"silent" framers and ratifiers of the 1787 Constitution. In addition, 
the contributors leave to future generations the task of discerning the 
collective purposes and perceptions of the constitutional "founders" of 
this era. 
However farfetched the metaphor may appear at first glance, upon 
reflection it is useful for at least two reasons. First, it highlights the 
difficulties inherent in the originalist project for constitutional inter-
pretation. 29 Whatever historical perspective may be gleaned by the 
twenty-first century readers of the Encyclopedia, if its contributor~ 
have not been able to speak beyond their times, their portrayal of the 
twentieth century's vision of the Constitution will be considered obso-
lete. Yet, to the extent that they have been successful in avoiding ob-
solescence, the contributors are likely to have focused on doctrinal and 
theoretical concepts at a level of abstraction that obscures controversy 
in application. 3° Furthermore, given the clear evidence of conflicting 
viewpoints on critical constitutional issues, the future user of the Ency-
clopedia will find it difficult to distill a common understanding from 
among its contributors alone, much less from the "silent reconsti-
tuters" among the many influential jurists, lawmakers, and scholars 
whose opinions have not been recorded. Thus, the Encyclopedia un-
masks the myth in the originalists' argument that there is any determi-
29. Interpretation of constitutional provisions according to the "framers' intent," once the 
terrain for esoteric and "principled" discussion among constitutional scholars, has become the 
ground for political debate since Attorney General Edwin Meese has fired the cannons of "strict 
construction" and "original intent" in his various broadsides against the liberal constitutional 
agenda. For accounts of the recent use of the originalist project in the Reagan administration, 
see L. CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW 115-
34, 302-05 (1987); and Collins & Skover, supra note 21. Informative summaries of arguments 
against originalism are found in M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALY· 
SIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 21-69 (1988); Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 469, 493-97 (1981); Schlag, Framers Intent: The Illegitimate Uses of History, 8 U. PUGET 
SOUND L. REv. 283 (1985). An analysis of the 1787 framers' theory of interpretation is given in 
Powell, The Original Understanding•of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985). 
30. See note 19 supra. 
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native starting point for constitutional analysis. 31 
Second, the metaphor should caution both today's and tomorrow's 
readers of the Encyclopedia against too formalistic a use of its con-
tents. Although it is an archive of much information and opinion, the 
Encyclopedia cannot be regarded as the quintessence of all that is 
known and knowable on the Constitution, for the record of the contin-
uing constitutional convention ultimately will not be closed. Unlike 
the major encyclopedias of a much earlier legal era, 32 the Encyclopedia 
is a testament to the interdisciplinary dynamism of constitutional law 
which does not have static meaning. 33 
In concluding their prefatory comments, the editors acknowledge 
that their Encyclopedia reveals the Constitution that has been and is, 
but only guides the Constitution that will be. "After all," they write, 
"when the American Constitution's tricentennial is celebrated in 2087, 
31. See generally Schlag, Cannibal Moves: The Metamorphoses of the Legal Distinction, 40 
STAN. L. REV. 929 (1988). 
32. The "formalist" or "conceptualist" period in American legal history, characterized by 
the predominant belief that Jaw is a formal science with a unitary set of rules which might be 
interpreted by lawyers and enforced by judges to resolve all possible controversies, culminated in 
the publication of the major general reference encyclopedias for legal doctrine that still exist -
Corpus Juris and Corpus Juris Secundum, American Jurisprudence, and the restatements - as 
well as the first multi-volume legal treatises to present encyclopedic treatments of specialized 
subjects, including such prominent examples as Wigmore on Evidence and Williston, The Law of 
Contracts. Quite naturally, these encyclopedic enterprises provided fuel for the cynical fire of the 
Legal Realists, who denigrated these works, particularly the restatements, as the progeny of a 
misguided Langdellian faith in the doctrinal rule oflaw. For general descriptions of the period of 
American legal conceptualism, and the rise of the general reference encyclopedias and specialized 
treatises, see G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 41-67 (1977) (dating the formalist 
era, labelled "The Age of Faith," from the late 1860s to the advent of Legal Realism in the late 
1920s and 1930s); L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 381-84, 400-03, 612-32 (2d 
ed. 1985); J. JOHNSON, AMERICAN LEGAL CULTURE, 1908-1940, at 17-24 (1981); and L. KAL-
MAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, at 3-14, 45-49 (1986). 
A worthwhile overview of constitutional scholarship in the late nineteenth century is given in 
Belz, The Constitution in the Gilded Age: The Beginnings of Constitutional Realism in American 
Scholarship, 13 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 110 (1969). A general account of the reactions of the Legal 
Realists to the formalist encyclopedic projects is given in G. GILMORE, supra, at 87-91; accounts 
of the Realist assault on the restatements are given in L. KALMAN, supra, at 25-28; J. JOHNSON, 
supra, at 54-55, 61, 67-68; J. SELIGMAN, THE HIGH CITADEL: THE INFLUENCE OF THE 
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 46 (1978). For some of the most vituperative attacks by Legal Realists 
on the excessive conceptualism in the restatements, see Arnold, The Restatement of the Law of 
Trusts, 31 COLUM. L. REv. 800, 814 (1931); Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional 
Approach, 35 CoLUM. L. REV. 809, 833 (1935); and Yntema, The Restatement of the Law of 
Conflict of Laws, 36 CoLUM. L. REv. 183, 192 (1936). General treatments of the Legal Realist 
movement and several of its leading authorities' are provided in Rumble, Legal Realism, vol. 3, p. 
1133; Rumble, Sociological Jurisprudence, vol. 4, p. 1705; Rumble, Roscoe Pound, vol. 3, p. 1431; 
White, Oliver Wendell Holmes, vol. 2, p. 920; Glennon, Jerome N. Frank, vol. 2, p. 763; and 
Parrish, Felix Frankfurter, vol. 2, p. 764. 
33. In light of this metaphorical account of the Encyclopedia as the record of the contempo-
rary constitutional convention, it may be surprising that the Encyclopedia contains no specific 
article on "framers' intent" or "originalism," although there may be traces of the approach in 
some entries. See, e.g., Berger, Impeachment, vol. 2, p. 957; Mendelson, Contract Clause, vol. 2, 
p. 493. Or, perhaps it is largely consistent with the spirit of the metaphor that the Encyclopedia 
place no intellectual boundaries on the meaning of "original intent," even as currently 
understood. 
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what the Constitution has become will depend less on the views of 
specialists than on the beliefs and behavior of the nation's citizens" 
(vol. 1, pp. x-xi). By the editors' apparent design, then, the Encyclope-
dia of the American Constitution is a scholarly venture fitting for our 
century and the next. It describes many of the elements that consti-
tute our national ideology in the present; and, by awakening or re-
shaping our awareness of those elements, stimulates the potential for 
reconstituting our ideology in the future. Both in what it says, and in 
its very act of saying it, the Encyclopedia reflects the political and soci-
ological character of its celebrated subject. 
For the twentieth century, the Encyclopedia is a living account of 
our living Constitution. For the next century, the Encyclopedia is al-
most certain to be the best surviving account of "the original intent" 
of those who reconstituted our supreme law. 
APPENDIX 
Structure and Organization of the Encyclopedia 
The beginning of volume 1 presents an alphabetical list of all arti-
cles by subject name, each entry accompanied by identification of its 
author. The list of articles is followed by an alphabetical list of all 
contributors; after each name, the contributor's vocational title and 
affillation, and an inventory of all entries written by the contributor, 
are given. 
Volume 4 contains the indices and appendices. A subject index 
and a name index list all pages on which the reader may find refer-
ences to the subject or the person identified; within each list of pages, 
numbers printed in boldface type refer to the main article written on 
the subject or person. A case index, providing an alphabetical listing 
of all judicial decisions mentioned in the Encyclopedia, the pages on 
which the references can be found, and case citations to the full opin-
ions in the American federal and state and the British reporter sys-
tems, will prove extremely useful to readers of the law. For the 
novice, a glossary offers definitions of legal terms, and indicates which 
terms of art are the subjects of separate entries in the Encyclopedia. 
The appendices in volume 4 include, in the order of presentation: 
(1) the resolution of Congress, dated February 21, 1787, calling for a 
Federal Constitutional Convention; (2) a copy of the Articles of Con-
federation; (3) a copy of the 1787 Constitution and its subsequent 
amendments; (4) the resolution of the Constitutional Convention, 
dated September 17, 1787, transmitting the proposed Constitution to 
Congress; (5) the letter of transmittal by George Washington, as Presi-
dent of Congress, accompanying the submission of the Constitution to 
Congress; (6) a chronology of important dates in the "Birth of the 
Constitution;" and, finally, (7) a chronology of important events in the 
"Development of American Constitutional Law." 
